Unvarnished report on fire shows why change is vital

A heart-wrenching report on the multiple factors that led to the deaths of nine Charleston firefighters 11 months ago no doubt would have led to the departure of Fire Chief Rusty Thomas had he not already decided to retire. Now, one of Charleston Mayor Joseph P. Riley Jr.'s most immediate tasks is to find the right leader for a department still suffering from the loss of so many brave men and in such need of changes in its method of operation.

Without question, that leader needs to come from outside the embattled department.

Mayor Riley said Friday during a question-and-answer session with this newspaper that he already has started the national search process. Also at the session, Gordon Routley, the leader of the city-commissioned team that released its exhaustive report on the horrific June 18 Sofa Super Store fire this week, made it clear that there is still much to be done to change the "stuck in the '70s" culture of the fire department.

Mr. Routley, a 40-year firefighting veteran, noted that the department is making progress on the more than 200 recommendations his team made shortly after arriving on the scene. But, he said, he still has some immediate concerns and singled out shortcomings in incident command procedures. While new training procedures are ongoing, he noted that advanced training and simulation on "big, complicated situations" remain part of the unfinished business.

The failure of incident command is a major finding in the consultants' report on the Sofa Super Store fire. Specifically, the report found that "the documented duties and responsibilities of an incident commander [Chief Thomas, after he arrived on the scene] were not performed and risk management guidelines were not adequately applied to the situation." The report also states that "the culture of the Charleston Fire Department promoted aggressive offensive tactics that exposed firefighters to excessive and avoidable risks and failed to apply basic firefighter safety practices."

Rather than being engaged in fighting the fire after his arrival, Chief Thomas should have remained at a distance at a fixed command center in order to survey all that was occurring and assess the risk to all those involved, Mr. Routley said. There is nothing more chilling in the report than its finding that 16 calls from the men inside the store went unheard. That could have been prevented, according to Mr. Routley, if someone had been assigned specifically to monitor the radios. Instead, he said, those on the scene were too engaged in other firefighting activities.

While the report emphasizes that blame for the nature of the blaze lies with the code violations by the Sofa Super Store, during the interview Mr. Routley also put the blame for mistakes made that night on Chief Thomas and his failure to move the fire department in the right direction. "Bottom line," he said, "it comes down to the fire chief." There was too much reliance, he said, on the department's top insurance rating — the highest in the state — and too little time spent on keeping up with the newer firefighting trends that put firefighter safety at a higher priority.

The consultants saw that firsthand shortly after their arrival in Charleston following the tragic blaze. Mr. Routley recalled that they went to a fire call and saw what they considered a dangerous "swarm attack" on the blaze by the firemen, along with the use of booster hoses. What they saw required and got immediate attention, resulting in the 200 recommendations the city has since been implementing and which, Mr. Routley said, could take as much as three years to complete.

While the mayor has said Chief Thomas was capable of bringing the department up to national firefighting standards, the chief apparently decided weeks ago that the internal turmoil was too great and the pressures he and his family were feeling too intense. The mayor told us Friday that it was his suggestion that the chief announce his retirement Wednesday before the report was issued Thursday and before either knew the contents. The mayor said he anticipated the report would be critical and felt the chief should be allowed to make the call rather than be seen as responding to an outcry to resign.

The report would have made that outcry inevitable. It details of myriad mistakes, from an inspection team's incomplete 2006 pre-fire plan for the building to the use of inadequate equipment and failed strategies at the fire scene.

But the most direct finger of blame in the report is pointed at the Sofa Super Store, which failed to get building permits for a number of additions to the building. Had those permits been obtained, according to the report, a sprinkler system would have been required and "the fire would have been quickly controlled with minor damage." It also notes that the fire would have been less severe if flammable liquids had not been improperly stored near the loading dock, and firefighters might have been able to get out of the building had exits not been blocked.

The mayor said the report provides an important lesson to members of the community as well as the fire department. He noted that the failure to get city building permits for additions can result in interior changes of which the city is unaware that can negate fire suppression components with deadly results.

The lessons learned by city officials have been excruciating ones, particularly in view of the department's previous 40-year streak of saving the lives of civilians without the loss of a firefighter. But the report's assessment of the loss of nine men in one conflagration makes it painfully clear why the night of June 18 ended so tragically.

As that report notes, it is impossible to change events that have already occurred, but it is essential to learn from them to prevent future tragedies in Charleston or elsewhere. The determination to prevent such a disastrous reoccurrence is the best possible memorial to the nine men who died.